![]() The northern-most attempt was at the Quneitra Gap, a pass south of Mount Hermon and overlooked by Mount Betal and Mount Avital. The Syrians attempted to break across the border in two places in the Golan. Fortunately, the civilian population of the Golan had been evacuated prior to the war. When the reserves did reach the front, they sometimes found their tanks not fully ready for battle and at other times loaned out to other units. Israeli military strategy has always relied upon having sufficient warning to mobilize its reserves, and in this instance the reserves were unable to reach the Golan Heights and Sinai before Syrian and Egyptian forces had already advanced beyond their borders. This hubris prevented a preemptive air attack that could have destroyed the Egyptian army as it was waiting to cross the Suez Canal and neutralized the deadly SAMS missiles on the Egyptian border. The Chief of Military Intelligence even refused to activate sophisticated listening devices planted in the communication system of the Egyptian command lest they be exposed. There was hubris among the leadership of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and a belief, particularly in the Intelligence branch, that Egypt and Syria were not ready for war. This was not because it did not know about Egyptian and Syrian war preparations, but because it chose to ignore them. On October 6 1973, on Yom Kippur day at 2.00 pm, Syria and Egypt attacked simultaneously on the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. The hill and bunkers of Tel Saki are a fitting memorial to the courage and heroism of the regular and reserve soldiers who turned a close defeat in the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War into a resounding victory. From close to defeat to victory during the Yom Kippur War
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